













motivations.	 Beauty	moves	 us,	 not	 necessarily	 to	 tears	 or	 rapt	 contemplation,	 but	 to	
practical	action;	crucially,	it	may	do	so	as	part	and	parcel	of	its	appreciation.	This	claim	is	





Kant’s	 thesis	 of	 aesthetic	 disinterest	 casts	 a	 domineering	 shadow	 over	 contemporary	
aesthetics.	 According	 to	 Kant,	 aesthetic	 judgement	 entails	 pleasure	 in	 an	 object’s	
perceptual	appearance.	This	pleasure	is	said	to	be	‘disinterested’	insofar	as	it	is	free	from	
practical	 interests	 and	 desires.	 (Kant’s	 theory	 is	 most	 often	 discussed	 as	 a	 theory	 of	
beauty.	I	shall	be	rather	liberal	in	my	understanding	of	the	view	and	take	it	as	a	theory	of	
aesthetic	 judgement	 more	 generally.)	 For	 Kant,	 aesthetic	 judgement	 is	 a	 matter	 of	
contemplating	 perceptual	 form,	with	 our	 sensory	 and	 cognitive	 faculties	 operating	 in	
complete	 absorption,	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 else.	 In	 not	 being	 based	 upon	 personal	
interests	or	desires,	this	pleasure	is	not	one	of	idiosyncratic	preference	or	mere	liking,	
what	Kant	calls	 ‘the	agreeable’	 (§3).	Nor	 is	 it	pleasure	 in	a	 thing’s	objective	utility,	 its	
being	 fit	 for	 its	 function,	what	Kant	calls	 ‘the	useful’	 (§4).	Rather,	aesthetic	 judgement	
entails	pleasure	in	a	thing’s	looking	good	(or	sounding	good,	etc.)	purely	for	the	looking	
at	 it	 (or	the	hearing	of	 it,	etc.),	entirely,	 that	 is,	 for	 its	own	sake.	Objects	 that	occasion	










objects	 and	 events	 in	 a	 uniquely	 detached	way.	 Here	 is	 Bell,	motivating	 his	 aesthetic	
formalism	and,	100	years	later,	Nanay,	demarcating	aesthetic	attention:		
	

























use	 the	 term	 ‘Kantian	disinterest’	 in	a	stipulative	manner	 to	cover	all	 such	views,	and	




Kantian	 disinterest	 has	 recently	 been	 challenged	 from	 a	 number	 of	 directions.	
Judgements	of	sexiness	may	be	thought	to	be	at	once	aesthetic,	yet	partially	constituted	
by	 the	 judge’s	 practical	 interests,	 i.e.	 sexual	 desires	 (Lintott	&	 Irvin	2016).	Moreover,	
some	encounters	with	beauty	are	significant	not	because	they	cause	one	to	shed	one’s	
idiosyncratic	interests,	values	and	desires,	but	because	they	reveal	and	transform	those	





a	 quite	 different	 problem	 for	 the	 thesis	 of	 Kantian	 disinterest,	 one	 that	 is	 fruitfully	
approached	via	the	notions	of	perceptual	attention	and	salience:	that	it	pays	insufficient	
attention	to	the	psychology	of	creators	of	art,	and	so	can	be	challenged	from	the	point	of	
view	 of	 art-making	 and	 not	 only	 art-viewing.	 As	 a	 preview:	what	 is	 salient	 (broadly:	
attention-grabbing)	in	one’s	perceptual	experience	on	a	given	occasion	is	a	function	of	
one’s	 interests,	 values,	 desires,	 expectations	 and	 beliefs	 at	 that	 time.	 Crucially,	 I	 shall	
argue	that	aesthetic	qualities	may	be	experienced	by	artists	as	salient	not	merely	in	the	
sense	 of	 being	 attention-grabbing,	 but	 also	 as	mandating	 action	 as	 part	 of	 an	 artistic	
response	 to	 those	 qualities.	 Beauty	 moves	 us,	 not	 necessarily	 to	 tears	 or	 rapt	
contemplation,	but	to	practical	action.	Beauty	may	inspire	deeds,	and	it	may	do	so	as	part	
and	parcel	of	its	appreciation.	Or	so	I	shall	argue.	To	help	fix	ideas,	I	focus	on	the	art	of	











judgement.	 That	 will	 be	 the	 take-home	 message.	 By	 attempting	 to	 divorce	 aesthetic	
judgement	from	practical	action,	they	view	such	judgement	through	the	lens	of	passive	
observation,	rather	than	active	creation.	Indeed,	an	underappreciated	problem	for	such	














they	make	aesthetic	 judgements	about	 those	works	and	(ii)	such	 judgement	are	made	
from	 a	 practical	 point	 of	 view;	 they	 are	 not	 made	 from	 a	 passive,	 disinterested	
















point	 of	 view	 of	 a	 dispassionate	 spectator,	 thereby	 flipping	 between	 interested	 and	
disinterested	perspectives	and	keeping	the	two	separate.	The	(dis)pleasure	taken	by	the	





partially	 constituted	 (or	 grounded,	 etc.)	 in	 the	 artist’s	 idiosyncratic	 interests,	 while	
remaining	 intuitively	 aesthetic,	 will	 Kantian	 disinterest	 be	 challenged.	 But	 as	 the	






attempt	 to	 elucidate	 the	 tension	 between	 art-making	 and	 Kantian	 disinterest	 by	
considering	the	art	of	photography	and	works	by	one	of	its	great	masters:	Henri	Cartier-










explicitly,	 with	 discussion	 of	 how	 perceptual	 attention	 alights	 on	 a	 region,	 object	 or	
feature	 in	 a	 non-involuntary,	 automatic	 way	 (sometimes	 called	 ‘exogenous’	 or	
‘exogenously-driven’	 attention).	 This	 aligns	 with	 a	 very	 natural	 reading	 of	 the	 term	
‘salient’	as	referring	 to	 that	which	 is	attention-grabbing.	Things	 that	are	salient	 for	an	
agent	are	things	which	capture,	divert	or	take	command	of	 the	agent’s	attention.	Such	
involuntary	 shifts	of	perceptual	 attention	will	 be	my	 focus	and	 contrast	with	 shifts	of	





Wu	 2014,	 pp.37-38).	 A	 crying	 voice	may	 automatically	 draw	 attention	 your	 auditory	
attention	 away	 from	 a	 conversation	 only	 because	 you	 recognise	 the	 voice	 to	 be	 your	
child’s.	 A	water	 cooler	may	 draw	 your	 visual	 attention	 only	 because	 you	 are	 thirsty.	





An	example	 from	beyond	 the	armchair:	 in	 experimental	 conditions,	Yi	 Jiang	and	 their	
colleagues	 (2006)	 found	 that	 erotic	 pictures	 either	 involuntarily	 capture	 or	 repel	
subjects’	 spatial	 attention,	dependent	on	 the	 sex	and	sexual	orientation	of	 the	 subject	







A	 second	 point:	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 what	 an	 agent	 finds	 salient	 is	 a	 product	 of	 their	
particular	psychology,	salience	patterns	can	imply	facts	about	character.	For	instance,	we	
may	find	others	morally	blameworthy	to	the	extent	that	certain	morally-relevant	facts	
are	 not	 salient	 to	 them.	 Failing	 to	 have	 one’s	 attention	 diverted	 by	 the	 surrounding	















solicited	 is	 present.	 Siegel	 calls	 the	 latter	 cases	 ones	 of	 “experienced	mandates.”	 For	
hopefully	very	many	parents,	hearing	their	child	crying	in	pain	involves	an	experienced	
mandate	and	is	not	a	mere	soliciting	experience:	the	child	sounds	as	if	it	is	to-be-checked-
on	 and	 the	 parent	 feels	 compelled	 to	 do	 so.	 Siegel	 (Ibid.,	 p52)	 characterises	 the	












Now,	 theories	 of	 Kantian	 disinterest	 claim	 that	 aesthetic	 judgements	 of,	 e.g.,	 beauty,	
elegance,	harmony,	proportion,	unity,	etc.	are	partially	constituted	by	a	contemplative	
experience	in	which	one	sheds	one’s	idiosyncratic	interests	and	is	perceptually	absorbed	
in	 an	 object’s	 appearance	 for	 its	 own	 sake,	 absent	 practical	 concerns.	 Insofar	 as	
attributions	 of	 strongly	 salient	 experiences	 imply	 both	 idiosyncratic	 interests	 of	 the	
agent,	combined	with	motivational	elements,	Kantian	disinterest	entails	that	there	can	be	
no	strongly	salient	aesthetic	experiences	of,	e.g.,	beauty,	elegance,	harmony,	proportion,	
unity,	 etc.	 A	 strongly	 salient	 aesthetic	 experience	 is	 had	 by	 an	 agent	 just	 in	 case	 they	
experience	an	object	to	be,	e.g.,	beautiful,	elegant,	harmonious,	proportioned,	unified,	etc.	
in	 an	 attention-grabbing	way	 that	 implicates	 one	 or	more	 idiosyncratic	 psychological	
features	of	that	agent	and	where	a	high	degree	of	motivation	to	act	on	that	experience	is	
present.	Such	experiences,	of	beauty	and	other	aesthetic	qualities,	are	conceptually	tied	
to	 the	 agent	 and	 their	 peculiar	 interests	 in	 ways	 that	 Kantian	 disinterest	 says	 is	










aim	 to	 direct	 evaluative	 focus	 onto	 agents,	 with	 emphasis	 on	 the	 skills,	 emotions,	





Roberts	 (2018)	 between	 faculty	 and	 trait	 aesthetic	 virtues,	 principally	 in	 relation	 to	
artistic	creation.	This	distinction	takes	inspiration	from	a	familiar	one	in	epistemology	at	
the	heart	of	the	dispute	between	reliabilism	and	responsibilism.	According	to	reliabilism,	
intellectual	virtue	 is	constituted	by	mere	 faculties	of	 the	agent:	a	good	memory,	 finely	
detailed	powers	of	perception,	keen	powers	of	inference	and	reasoning,	etc.	(Sosa	2007)	
According	 to	 responsibilism,	 intellectual	 virtue	 is	 constituted	by	 aspects	 of	 an	 agent’s	
character:	 traits	 of	 open-mindedness,	 adaptability,	 carefulness,	 humility,	 fairness,	 etc.	
(Zagzebski	1996)		
	








according	 to	Roberts.	 For	 instance,	hyperreaslistic	portraits	by	Chuck	Close	are	 finely	
executed,	requiring	a	keen	eye	for	detail	and	refined	motor-skills.	The	song	“Parakeet”	by	




and	constitute	more	deeply	who	the	agent	 is	as	a	person.	Chiefly,	 this	 is	 through	such	
virtues	revealing	core	concerns,	values	and	principles	to	which	the	agent	is	evaluatively	
committed.	 Attributions	 of	 these	 aesthetic	 virtues	 thus	 imply	 facts	 about	 the	 agent’s	
motives	 in	 ways	 that	 attributions	 of	 mere	 faculty	 virtues	 do	 not.	 Such	 works	 have,	
according	 to	 Roberts,	 motivational	 value.	 The	 chief	 idea	 is	 that	 artworks	 can	 be	
aesthetically	evaluated	not	simply	for	their	intrinsic	formal	qualities,	nor	for	how	they	
are	 the	 product	 of	 an	 agent’s	 remarkable	 aesthetic	 faculties	 or	 skills,	 but	 for	 being	















just	 in	 case	 they	 experience	 an	 object	 to	 be,	 e.g.,	 beautiful,	 elegant,	 harmonious,	
proportioned,	 unified,	 etc.	 in	 an	 attention-grabbing	 way	 that	 implicates	 one	 or	more	
idiosyncratic	psychological	features	of	the	agent	and	where	a	high-degree	of	motivation	














motivated	 to	 produce	works	 of	 art	 as	 a	 result.	When	 artists	 are	 so	 admired,	 they	 are	
thereby	 admired	 for	 their	 trait	 aesthetic	 virtues,	 aesthetic	 virtues	 that,	 unlike	 mere	
faculty	virtues,	imply	motivational	facts:	that	the	artist	was	moved	to	produce	that.	To	
make	 this	 idea	 concrete,	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 photography,	 first	 discussing	 its	 relation	 to	







world,	 one	 that	 is	 manifest	 in	 their	 photographs.	 It	 might	 be	 thought	 that	 to	 have	 a	
photographer’s	eye	is	merely	to	possess	certain	aesthetic	faculty	virtues,	e.g.,	to	visually	
discern	spatial	forms	or	to	imagine	how	a	3-D	scene	will	appear	in	the	2-D	surface	of	the	
resulting	photograph,	 etc.	We	 can	 also	 add	here	 the	practical	 skills	 to	 knowledgeably	
control	certain	variables,	like	shutter	speed,	focal	length	and	lighting	conditions.	Consider	
as	well	how	an	agent	with	a	photographer’s	eye	may	perceptually	categorise	objects	in	














Sometimes	 it	 happens	 that	 you	 stall,	 delay,	 wait	 for	 something	 to	 happen.	
Sometimes	you	have	the	feeling	that	here	are	all	the	makings	of	a	picture—except	
for	just	one	thing	that	seems	to	be	missing.	But	what	one	thing?	Perhaps	someone	










Memory	 is	 very	 important,	 particularly	 in	 respect	 to	 the	 recollection	 of	 every	
picture	you’ve	taken	while	you’ve	been	galloping	at	the	speed	of	the	scene	itself.	
The	photographer	must	make	sure,	while	he	is	still	in	the	presence	of	the	unfolding	












Cartier-Bresson’s	 Aquila	 degli	 Abruzzi;	 Sifnos,	 Greece;	 and	 Hyères,	 France.)	 Indeed,	








attribute	not	only	certain	remarkable	 faculties	or	skills.	 It	can	 implicate	aspects	of	 the	
photographer’s	character,	their	concerns	and	motivation.	Talk	of	‘the	photographer’s	eye’	
is	 thus	 not	 always	 talk	 about	 a	 skill-based	 type,	 but	 something	 more	 trope-like:	 a	
particular,	unrepeatable	way	of	seeing	the	world.	Cartier-Bresson’s	photographer’s	eye,	
	 9	
for	 instance,	 is	 not	 that	 of	Nan	Goldin’s	 or	Ansel	 Adams’s.	 Some	photographs	 are	 the	


















So,	 Cartier-Bresson	 thus	 possessed	 a	 photographer’s	 eye	 that	 was	 not	 merely	






Here,	 then,	 is	 the	key	claim:	examining	Cartier-Bresson’s	photographs	and	reading	his	
thoughts	on	photography,	it	is	natural	to	think	that	human	life	was	strongly	aesthetically	
salient	for	him.	That	is,	the	aesthetic	aspects	of	everyday	life	did	not	take	command	of	his	
attention,	 yet	 leave	 him	 unmoved;	 that	 would	 be	 to	 attribute	 mere	 weakly	 salient	
aesthetic	experience	of	human	life.	Rather,	it	is	plausible	that	he	found	beauty,	serenity,	
and	other	aesthetic	qualities	in	small	details	of	human	life	in	an	attention-grabbing	way	











those	 people,	 places	 and	 events	 to	 be	 objects	 of	 aesthetic	 interest.	 A	 tourist	 may	 be	
concerned	to	capture	the	breath-taking	beauty	of	their	surroundings	and,	as	a	result,	have	
their	attention	grabbed	by	 the	magnificence	of	particular	natural	 scenes	and	vistas	 in	




feeling	compelled	 to	snap	away	on	 their	phone	as	a	 result.	Both	count	as	 instances	of	
strongly	salient	aesthetic	experience.	Photography	is	a	case	where	beauty	may	at	once	







photograph	 those	objects	 remains	quite	 another.	The	disinterested	 judgement	merely	
causes	a	motivation	to	act.	Indeed,	recall	the	earlier	worry	about	Gaut’s	way	of	motivating	













the	 motivation	 to	 photograph	 O.	 Take	 the	 first	 response.	 Since	 it	 says	 the	 two	 are	
connected	causally,	this	would	entail	that	the	photographer’s	aesthetic	judgement	of	O	
and	their	motivation	to	photograph	O	can	be	understood	in	isolation	from	one	another.	
The	 second	 response	 broadly	 agrees	 on	 this	 matter.	 For	 it	 denies	 that	 there	 is	 any	









present,	 motivation	 to	 photograph	 O	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 not	 be	 present	 as	 well.	
Construing	 the	 connection	between	 the	photographer’s	 aesthetic	 judgement	and	 their	
motivation	to	photograph	either	as	a	mere	causal	one,	as	the	first	response	does,	or	as	
not	connected	at	all,	as	the	second	does,	fails	to	give	a	plausible	account	of	the	strength	of	








In	 claiming	 that	 (some	 of)	 the	 experiences	 of	 (some)	 photographers	 are	 fully	 salient	
aesthetic	experiences,	there	is	one	respect	in	which	I	wish	to	depart	from	Siegel.	Recall	




















who	 is	 motivated	 to	 act	 but,	 for	 whatever	 reason	 does	 not,	 may	 well	 experience	




salient	 experiences/experienced	 mandates	 never	 involve	 experiencing	 a	 stimulus	 as	




















pleasure	 in	 an	 object’s	 appearance	 that	 is	 free	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 one’s	 personal	
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Second,	 I	have	claimed	 that	we	have	good	reason	 to	 think	 that	 there	are,	 in	 fact,	 fully	
salient	 aesthetic	 experiences.	 A	 motivating	 thought	 here	 is	 that	 beauty	 sometimes	
inspires	action	rather	than	cool	observation.	Against	the	background	of	a	virtue-based	
account,	 where	 the	 character	 and	 motives	 of	 artists	 are	 aesthetically	 assessable,	 my	
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